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Abstract—Recent work has established that when transmitter
Alice wishes to communicate reliably to recipient Bob without
detection by warden Willie, with additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channels between all parties, communication is limited
to O(√n) bits in n channel uses. However, this assumes Willie
has an accurate statistical characterization of the channel. When
Willie has uncertainty about such and his receiver is limited to a
threshold test on the received power, Alice can transmit covertly
with a power that does not decrease with n, thus conveying
O(n) bits covertly and reliably in n uses of an AWGN channel.
Here, we consider covert communication of O(n) bits in n
channel uses while generalizing the environment and removing
any restrictions on Willie’s receiver. We assume an uninformed
“jammer” is present to help Alice, and we consider AWGN
and block fading channels. In some scenarios, Willie’s optimal
detector is a threshold test on the received power. When the
channel between the jammer and Willie has multiple fading
blocks per codeword, a threshold test on the received power is
not optimal. However, we establish that Alice can remain covert
with a transmit power that does not decrease with n even when
Willie employs an optimal detector.
Index Terms—Low probability of detection communication,
wireless covert communication, physical layer security
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of secure communications centers on preventing an
adversary from determining the content of the message. How-
ever, there are circumstances where communicating parties
Alice and Bob may want covert communication: hiding the
very existence of their communication from a watchful adver-
sary Willie. Examples include communicating in the presence
of an authoritarian government who may want to curtail any
organization by certain entities, or military communications
where detection might inform an adversary that there is activity
in a given geographical area.
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As defined precisely below, recent work has studied reliable
covert communication, which requires: (i) Willie’s error in
detecting that Alice transmitted a message to Bob be arbitrarily
close to random guessing; and (ii) Bob’s error of recovering
Alice’s message be arbitrarily small. When the Alice-to-Bob
and Alice-to-Willie channels are additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channels, [2] and [3] showed a square root law
(SRL): provided Alice and Bob share a secret of sufficient
length prior to transmission, Alice can communicate covertly
to Bob if and only if she employs a per-symbol power of no
more than O(1/√n), which decreases to 0 in the limit of large
n. Thus, O(√n) bits (and no more) can be transmitted in n
channel uses [3]. Follow-on work has considered the length
of the pre-shared secret in [4] and [5], characterization of the
constant hidden by Big-O notation in [5] and [6], and both the
theory and experimental verification of covert communication
over quantum channels in [7] and [8].
Subsequent work considered whether positive rate covert
communications, which requires the transmission of O(n) bits
in n channel uses, is possible. Lee et al. in [9] demonstrated
that positive rate is indeed achievable over AWGN channels if
Willie has uncertainty about the statistics of the background
noise and is restricted to a receiver that employs a threshold
on the received power when attempting to detect Alice. Che et
al. in [10] proved that positive rate is achievable if Willie has
uncertainty in the parameters of the binary symmetric channel
between Alice and himself. In [11], the authors re-visit the
results of [9] and [10]. Rather than starting with parametric
uncertainty in Willie’s knowledge of the noise statistics, [11]
allows Willie to have access to a large collection of inputs
spanning many possible codeword slots and to employ them
in any way that he deems suitable. Then, the lack of knowledge
of channel statistics at Willie does not increase the order of
the covert throughput from Alice to Bob [11]. This is because
Willie is able to use any “quiet” periods to estimate the noise
statistics of his receiver accurately and then detect if Alice is
transmitting, even if he does not know a priori the time at
which Alice might transmit.
In this work, we allow Willie to have a general receiver,
as in [11], but we seek conditions under which Alice can
transmit with power not decreasing in the blocklength n; in the
case of an AWGN channel between Alice and Bob, this then
achieves the transmission of O(n) bits covertly in n channel
uses. To do such, we add another node to the environment, the
“jammer”, who Willie knows is transmitting. For example, this
might be a jammer in an electronic warfare (EW) environment
placed by Alice and Bob, or, as discussed in Section VI, ac©2017 IEEE
2jammer placed in the environment by Willie for other security
objectives. If this jammer randomly varies his/her transmit
power appropriately or if time-varying multipath fading causes
sufficient variation, channel estimation during periods outside
the time period when Willie is attempting to detect Alice’s
transmission cannot be used to estimate the statistics of the
noise impacting Willie’s receiver during the period of interest.
Hence, the results of [11] do not apply; rather, we arrive at
a similar mathematical problem to that considered in [9]. A
limitation of the achievability results of [9] is that the power
detector is not established to be the optimal receiver for Willie;
in fact, in the case of block fading channels with multiple
fading blocks per codeword, it is known to be sub-optimal.
Here, in contrast to [9], we establish covert communication
against any detector that Willie might employ.
We consider both additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
and standard block fading channels. Note that the problem is
readily solved if the jammer and Alice are closely coordinated
(i.e. , an “informed” jammer) by the following construction.
Alice generates a codebook by drawing codeword symbols
independently from a Gaussian distribution, and provides this
codebook only to Bob as the shared secret. At the time Alice
starts to transmit a codeword, the jammer turns down the
power of his transmission of Gaussian noise, and then he turns
it back up at the moment Alice finishes transmitting. Willie is
then unable to determine that any change has taken place when
Alice is transmitting. We are interested in the case where the
jammer and Alice do not coordinate. In the AWGN case, our
construction has the jammer randomly change his/her power
of the Gaussian noise in each “slot” of n symbols, where n is
the codeword length used by Alice. By doing such, Willie is
unaware of the background noise to expect and it is plausible,
particularly based on the work of [9], that Alice should be
able to achieve positive rate covert communication to Bob.
To establish this result rigorously against an arbitrary receiver
at Willie, we first establish that Willie’s optimal receiver is
indeed a comparison of the received power to a threshold, from
which the achievability of positive rate covert communication
follows.
We then consider a block fading channel with M fading
blocks per codeword of length n. If M = 1, we demonstrate
that a threshold test on the total received power in the
codeword slot is the optimal detector at Willie, from which
covert transmission by Alice with power not decreasing in
the blocklength n follows. When M > 1, a threshold test on
the total received power at Willie is sub-optimal. Thus, we
first establish a technical property on the structure of Willie’s
optimal detector and then show that this property suffices to
establish the ultimate goal when the jammer-to-Willie channel
is anM > 1 block fading channel: Alice can covertly transmit
with a power that does not decrease with her blocklength n.
Our main contributions are:
1) The consideration of covert communication in the pres-
ence of an uninformed jammer.
2) The demonstration of the optimality of a power detector
at Willie for the AWGN and M = 1 block fading cases,
from which the ability of Alice to transmit covertly with
a power that does not decrease with her blocklength
follows.
3) The demonstration of the ability for Alice to transmit
covertly with a power that does not decrease with her
blocklength in the M > 1 block fading scenario, even
when Willie uses an optimal detector (which is not a
power detector in this case).
Section II presents the system model and performance
metrics considered in this work. Section III considers the
AWGN case, and Section IV extends these results to the
mathematically similar M = 1 block fading case. The M > 1
block fading case requires a significantly different approach,
which is described in Section V. Section VI summarizes two
potential points of discussion based on the results presented:
1) in the electronic warfare model, active jamming by adver-
saries may help facilitate covert communication; and 2) the
difference between positive rate communication in the wireless
scenarios presented in this work and typical steganography
systems. Finally, Section VII presents conclusions and ideas
for continuing work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND METRICS
A. System Model
Consider a scenario where Alice (“a”) would like to com-
municate covertly to Bob (“b”) without detection by a warden
Willie (“w”), and suppose a jammer (“j”) is active in the
environment who is willing to assist with this communication.
The geographic model is shown in Figure 1. The distances
from Alice to Willie and Alice to Bob are denoted by da,w
and da,b respectively. The distances from the jammer to Willie
and the jammer to Bob are dj,w and dj,b respectively.
We are interested in Alice’s ability to transmit covertly
in a slot equal to the codeword length n and Willie’s abil-
ity to detect such a transmission in that slot. For integer
constant T > 0, we consider a discrete-time channel with
T slots, each of length n symbols, as shown in Figure 2,
with the nT symbols indexed by k = −T2 n + 1,−T2 n +
2 . . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . , T2 n − 1, T2 n. We assume that the
slot of interest is slot t = 0; hence, Alice may (or may
not) transmit for a duration of n symbols starting at time
k = 1, and Willie’s goal is to detect whether or not such
a transmission took place using observations for all k =
−T2 n+1,−T2 n+2 . . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . , T2 n−1, T2 n, since
observations outside of k = 1, 2, . . . , n might be useful to
Willie in estimating aspects of the environment [11]. The
jammer is “uninformed” in the sense that it does not know
if Alice transmits, and if Alice transmits, the jammer does not
know that Alice is going to use a slot starting at time k = 1.
Alice transmits a message with probability p and if she
decides to transmit, she maps her message to the complex
symbol sequence f = [f1, f2, . . . , fn] and sends it in the
t = 0 slot corresponding to symbols k = 1, 2, . . . , n. The
jammer is allowed to transmit continuously (in all symbols
of all slots) subject only to an average power limitation of
Pmax per symbol. Let the (complex) signal transmitted by the
jammer for all time slots be given by {gt}
T
2 −1
t=−T2
, where gt =
[gtn+1, gtn+2, . . . , gtn+n] is the vector of transmitted jamming
3Fig. 1. Wireless communication scenario. With the help of a jammer, Alice
attempts to transmit covertly to Bob in the presence of a watchful adversary
Willie.
signals sent during the tth slot, with the per symbol power
constraint E[|gk|2] ≤ Pmax.
1) AWGN channel model: Consider first the AWGN
channel. Denote the collection of channel outputs at
Willie over all time slots as: {Zt}
T
2 −1
t=−T2
, where Zt =
[Ztn+1, Ztn+2, . . . , Ztn+n] is the vector of observations col-
lected during the tth slot. Hence, for slot t, i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
Ztn+i =


fi
d
α/2
a,w
+ gtn+i
d
α/2
j,w
+N
(w)
tn+i, Alice transmits and t = 0
gtn+i
d
α/2
j,w
+N
(w)
tn+i, else,
(1)
where α is the path-loss exponent, and {N (w)k , k = −T2 n +
1,−T2 n + 2 . . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . , T2 n − 1, T2 n} is a set
of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean
complex Gaussian random variables, each with variance
E[|N (w)k |2] = σ2w.
Similarly, denote the collection of channel outputs at
Bob over all time slots as: {Yt}
T
2 −1
t=−T2
, where Yt =
[Ytn+1, Ytn+2, . . . , Ytn+n] is the vector of observations col-
lected during the tth slot. Hence, for slot t, i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
Ytn+i =


fi
d
α/2
a,b
+ gtn+i
d
α/2
j,b
+N
(b)
tn+i, Alice transmits and t = 0
gtn+i
d
α/2
j,b
+N
(b)
tn+i, else,
(2)
where {N (b)k , k = −T2 n + 1,−T2 n +
2 . . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . , T2 n − 1, T2 n} is a set of i.i.d. zero-
mean complex Gaussian random variables, each with variance
E[|N (b)k |2] = σ2b.
2) Block fading channels: Consider next the standard
Rayleigh block fading channel, as shown in Figure 3. The
fading is constant for a block of n/M symbols but changes
independently to a different value for the next block, whereM
is the number of fading blocks per codeword slot [12]. Denote
h
(x,y)
t,m , m = 1, . . . ,M as the (complex) fading coefficient for
the mth block during slot t between transmitter x and receiver
y, where x is either “a” (Alice) or “j” (jammer), and y is either
“w” (Willie) or “b” (Bob). By the Rayleigh fading assumption,
h
(x,y)
t,m , m = 1, . . . ,M is assumed to be a zero mean complex
Gaussian random variable with E[|h(x,y)t,m |2] = 1 for all
channels. The fading processes affecting different transmitter-
receiver pairs are assumed to be independent of each other.
For slot t, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, Willie observes:
Ztn+i =


h
(a,w)
t,⌊(i−1)M
n
⌋+1
fi
d
α/2
a,w
+
h
(j,w)
t,⌊(i−1)M
n
⌋+1
gtn+i
d
α/2
j,w
+N
(w)
tn+i, Alice tx, t=0
h
(j,w)
t,⌊(i−1)M
n
⌋+1
gtn+i
d
α/2
j,w
+N
(w)
tn+i, else.
(3)
For slot t, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, Bob observes:
Ytn+i =


h
(a,b)
t,⌊(i−1)M
n
⌋+1
fi
d
α/2
a,b
+
h
(j,b)
t,⌊(i−1)M
n
⌋+1
gtn+i
d
α/2
j,b
+N
(b)
tn+i, Alice tx, t=0
h
(j,b)
t,⌊(i−1)M
n
⌋+1
gtn+i
d
α/2
j,b
+N
(b)
tn+i, else.
(4)
B. Metrics, hypothesis testing, and likelihood ratio ordering
Based on his observations over all time slots, Willie must
determine whether Alice transmitted in time slot t = 0. The
null hypothesis (H0) is that Alice did not transmit and the
alternative hypothesis (H1) is that that Alice transmitted a
message. Define P (H0) = 1− p as the probability that Alice
does not transmit and P (H1) = p as the probability that Alice
transmits in time slot t = 0, where we assume (pessimistically)
that p is known to Willie. Willie seeks to minimize his
probability of error Pe = (1−p)·PFA+p·PMD, where PMD and
PFA are the probabilities of missed detection and false alarm at
Willie, respectively. Per [13], Pe ≥ min(p, 1−p)·(PFA+PMD).
Hence, we will say that Alice achieves covert communication
if, for any ǫ > 0, PMD+PFA > 1− ǫ for n sufficiently large.1
We will say that Alice can transmit covertly with power not
decreasing in n if, for any ǫ > 0, there exists Pf > 0 not
dependent on n (but possibly dependent on ǫ) such that, as
n→∞, a system employing power Pf is covert. Bob should
also be capable of reliably decoding Alice’s message [3]. Bob
can reliably decode messages from Alice if, for any δ > 0,
his probability of error is less than δ for n sufficiently large.
We assume that Willie has full knowledge of the statistical
model: the parameters for Alice’s random codebook generation
and the jammer’s random interference generation, the noise
variance σ2w, and in the case of fading on the Alice-to-
Willie channel or jammer-to-Willie link, the statistics of that
fading. Thus, Willie’s test is between two simple hypotheses
for Alice’s transmission state, and he has complete statistical
knowledge of his observations when either hypothesis is true.
Therefore, by applying the Neyman-Pearson (NP) criterion,
the optimal test for Willie to minimize his probability of error
is the likelihood ratio test (LRT) [14, Chapter 3.3],
Λ(Z˜) =
f
Z˜|H1(Z˜|H1)
f
Z˜|H0(Z˜|H0)
H1
≷
H0
γ, (5)
1This guarantees that Willie’s probability of error is within ǫ of the
probability of error min(p, 1 − p) obtained if he ignores his observations
and chooses the hypothesis H0 and H1 that was most likely a priori.
4Fig. 2. Representation of the indexing of the nT symbol periods in T slots, each of length n. Alice decides to transmit in slot t = 0 with probability p, and
Willie attempts to detect a transmission in that slot.
Fig. 3. Model for multiple block fading conditions where x is either Alice
or the jammer and y is either Willie or Bob.
where γ = P (H0)/P (H1), and fZ˜|H1(·|H1) and fZ˜|H0(·|H0)
are the probability density functions (pdfs) for Willie’s obser-
vations over all slots given Alice transmitted in the t = 0 slot
or given Alice did not transmit in the t = 0 slot, respectively.
As can be inferred by the assumption of a power detector
for Willie’s receiver in [9] and made precise in the proof of
Theorem 1 below, a desirable property for the likelihood ratio
Λ(·) to exhibit is monotonicity. In the remainder of this section,
we describe an approach for establishing such a property that
applies in our context.
We employ the concept of stochastic ordering [15] to derive
the desired monotonicity results in a more streamlined fashion
relative to our preliminary work in [1]. We say that random
variable X is smaller than W in the likelihood ratio order
(written as X ≤lr W ) when fW (x)/fX(x) is non-decreasing
over the union of their supports, where fW (x) and fX(x)
are their respective probability density functions. Consider a
family of pdfs {gθ(·), θ ∈ X} where X is a subset of the
real line. Let X(θ) denote a random variable with density
gθ(·) for fixed parameter θ. Let Θ denote a random variable
with support X and probability distribution function FΘ(·);
we denote X(Θ) as the random variable that is the mixture
of the random variables X(θ) under distribution FΘ(θ); that
is, the probability density function of X(Θ) is given by:
fX(Θ)(x) =
∫
θ∈X
gθ(x)dF (θ), x ∈ R. (6)
We will rely on the following result regarding mixtures of
random variables.
Lemma 1. [Theorem 1.C.11 in [15]] Consider a family of
probability density functions {gθ(·), θ ∈ X} with X a subset
of the real line. Let Θ0 and Θ1 denote random variables with
support in X and probability distribution functions F0(θ) and
F1(θ), respectively. Let W0 and W1 be random variables such
that Wi =d X(Θi), i = 0, 1, (where =d is defined as equality
in distribution or law):
fWi(x) =
∫
θ∈X
gθ(x)dFi(θ), i = 0, 1;x ∈ R. (7)
If
X(θ) ≤lr X(θ′), θ ≤ θ′ (8)
and
Θ0 ≤lr Θ1, (9)
then
W0 ≤lr W1. (10)
III. AWGN CHANNELS
We first consider the case of additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channels between all nodes, with the slot boundaries
between Alice, Willie, and the jammer synchronized, and, as
in [3], assume that Alice and Bob share a secret of unlimited
length. We provide a construction for Alice and the jammer,
and then demonstrate that this construction makes Willie’s
optimal detector a power detector. The transmission of O(n)
bits in n channel uses is then demonstrated. It is assumed that
da,w and dj,w are known to Alice, although it will be readily
apparent that a lower-bound to da,w and an upper-bound to
dj,w are sufficient to establish the results.
Construction: We employ random coding arguments and
generate K codewords, each of length n, by independently
drawing symbols from a zero-mean complex Gaussian distri-
bution with variance Pf , where Pf is determined later. This
codebook is revealed to Alice and Bob, is used only once,
and comprises the shared secret unknown to Willie (and the
jammer). If Alice decides to transmit in slot t = 0, she
selects the codeword corresponding to her message, sets fi
to the ith symbol of that codeword, and transmits the se-
quence f1, f2, . . . , fn. The jammer, with knowledge of the slot
boundaries but without knowledge of whether Alice transmits
in a given slot (or at all), transmits a symbol drawn inde-
pendently from a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution
during each symbol period. However, the variance of this
Gaussian distribution is not constant; in particular, during
the tth slot, the jammer draws each of its symbols indepen-
dently from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with variance
E[|gtn+i|2] = P (j)t , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, with P (j)t changing
between slots. The sequence of variances employed across the
slots, P
(j)
t , t = −T2 ,−T2 + 1, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , T2 − 2, T2 − 1
is an i.i.d. sequence of uniform random variables on [0, Pmax],
5where Pmax, as defined in Section II, is the maximum average
power per symbol that the jammer can employ.
Per above, Alice’s codebook is only shared with Bob and
thus is unknown to Willie. However, Willie knows everything
else about how the system is constructed, including the length
of the codeword n, the distribution from which the codeword
symbols are drawn (including Pf ), the distribution of the
jamming power (including Pmax), the time of Alice’s potential
transmission, and his distances from Alice and the jammer.
Next, we establish that Willie’s optimal strategy for detecting
Alice’s transmission is a power detector.
Lemma 2. Under assumptions of the AWGN model and the
construction given above, Willie’s optimal detector compares
the total received power in slot t = 0 to a threshold.
Proof: Consider Willie’s attempt to detect Alice during the
slot t = 0 of interest. Since the jammer’s power outside of this
slot is independent of the jammer’s power within the slot and
since Willie knows σ2w, it is sufficient for Willie to consider
the vector of observations Z0 only within slot t = 0, as
defined in Section II. Hence, to simplify notation, we drop
the slot index and denote the input to Willie’s receiver as
Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn].
Given the assumptions of the lemma, the distribution of Z
is complex Gaussian. Under H0, Willie observes only the jam-
ming signal in addition to background noise. UnderH1, Willie
observes both the jamming signal and Alice’s transmission in
addition to background noise. Let θ denote the variance of the
power observed due to Alice’s transmissions and the jammer’s
signal and thus define Z(θ) = [Z1(θ), Z2(θ), . . . , Zn(θ)],
where Zi(θ) ∼ CN (0, σ2w + θ). We thus distinguish between
H0 and H1 by introducing two non-negative valued random
variables Θ0 and Θ1 with probability density functions:
fΘρ(θ) =


1/ζ, 0 < θ ≤ Pmax/dαj,w, ρ = 0
1/ζ, σ2a < θ ≤ σ2a + Pmax/dαj,w, ρ = 1,
0, otherwise,
(11)
where ζ = Pmax/d
α
j,w and σ
2
a = Pf/d
α
a,w. The pdf of Willie’s
observations conditioned on θ is:
fZ(θ)(z) =
n∏
i=1
1
π(σ2w + θ)
exp
(
− |zi|
2
(σ2w + θ)
)
=
(
1
π(σ2w + θ)
)n
exp
(
− z
(σ2w + θ)
)
, (12)
where z =
∑n
i=1 |zi|2. Thus, by the Fisher-Neyman Factor-
ization Theorem, the total power Z(θ) =
∑n
i=1 |Zi(θ)|2 is
a sufficient statistic for Willie’s test. Let χ2l denote a chi-
squared random variable with l degrees of freedom. Then
Z(θ) = (σ2w + θ)χ
2
2n. Since Willie does not know either Θ0
or Θ1, his LRT becomes:
Λ(Z) =
EΘ1 [fZ(θ)(Z)]
EΘ0 [fZ(θ)(Z)]
H1
≷
H0
γ.
Next we show that Λ(·) is monotone. From the definition of
a chi-squared random variable, Z(θ) ≤lr Z(θ′) whenever θ ≤
θ′. In addition, applying the definition of ≤lr to the densities
of Θ0,Θ1 yields that Θ0 ≤lr Θ1. The application of Lemma
1 then yields that Λ(·) is non-decreasing in z. Thus, the LRT
is equivalent to the test:
Z
H1
≷
H0
Γn
corresponding to a threshold test on the total received power.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions of the AWGN model,
there exists a communication strategy for Alice, Bob, and the
jammer whereby Alice transmits O(n) bits in n channel uses
reliably and covertly to Bob in the presence of Willie.
Proof: Construction: Alice and the jammer employ the con-
struction given at the beginning of Section III. Per Lemma 2,
the optimal detector for Willie is to employ a threshold test
Z ≷H1H0 Γn on the total received power. Dividing both sides by
n yields the equivalent test:
Z
n
H1
≷
H0
τn, (13)
where τn ≡ Γn/n. Whereas there is an optimal τn for any
finite n, we will establish for any sequence of τn that Willie
chooses, the detector is asymptotically useless as n → ∞;
that is, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a construction such that
PFA + PMD > 1− ǫ for sufficiently large n.
Analysis: Note that σ2j = Uζ, where U is a uniform random
variable on [0, 1]. Recall that Willie does not know the value
of U . Let PFA(u) and PMD(u) be Willie’s probability of false
alarm and probability of missed detection conditioned on U =
u, respectively. Then,
PFA(u) = P
(
Z
n
≥ τn|U = u,H0
)
. (14)
Recall that χ2l denotes a chi-squared random variable with
l degrees of freedom. Under H0 and given U = u, Z =
(σ2w + uζ)χ
2
2n and Z/n = (σ
2
w + uζ)χ
2
2n/n. By the weak
law of large numbers, χ22n/n converges in probability to 1;
hence, for any δ > 0, ∃N0 (not dependent on u) such that, for
n ≥ N0,
P
(
χ22n
n
∈
(
1− δ
σ2w + ζ
, 1 +
δ
σ2w + ζ
))
> 1− ǫ
2
. (15)
Hence, for any n > N0,
P
(
Z
n
∈
(
(σ2w + uζ)
(
1− δ
σ2w + ζ
)
,
(σ2w + uζ)
(
1 +
δ
σ2w + ζ
)))
> 1− ǫ
2
. (16)
Since u ≤ 1, σ2w + uζ < σ2w + ζ and thus,
P
(
Z
n
∈ (σ2w + uζ − δ, σ2w + uζ + δ)
)
> 1− ǫ
2
. (17)
Therefore, PFA(u) ≥ 1 − ǫ/2 for any τn < σ2w + uζ − δ.
Likewise, following analogous arguments, there existsN1 such
that, for any n > N1 (not dependent on u):
PMD(u) = P
(
Z
n
≤ τn|U = u,H1
)
> 1− ǫ
2
(18)
6for any τn > σ
2
w + uζ + σ
2
a + δ. Define the set A = {u :
σ2w + uζ − δ < τn < σ2w + uζ + σ2a + δ}. We have established
that, for any u ∈ Ac and any n > max(N0, N1), PFA(u) +
PMD(u) ≥ 1− ǫ2 . The probability of event A is bounded as:
P (A) = P
(
τn − σ2w − σ2a − δ
ζ
≤ U ≤ τn − σ
2
w + δ
ζ
)
≤ σ
2
a + 2δ
ζ
. (19)
Hence, choosing δ = ζǫ/8 and σ2a = ζǫ/4 yields:
P (Ac) ≥ 1− ǫ
2
. (20)
Therefore, the summation of Willie’s false alarm and missed
detection is lower-bounded as:
PFA + PMD = EU [PFA(U) + PMD(U)] (21)
≥ EU [PFA(U) + PMD(U)|Ac]P (Ac) (22)
> 1− ǫ. (23)
Hence, Alice can employ codebooks with power Pf = σ
2
ad
α
a,w
and remain covert from Willie. Recognizing that the maximum
interference caused by the jammer at Bob can be upper-
bounded and hence the received signal-to-noise ratio at Bob
can be lower-bounded by a constant, Alice can transmit O(n)
bits in n channel uses covertly and reliably to Bob.
IV. M = 1 BLOCK FADING CHANNELS
A. Covertness with Transmit Power not Decreasing in the
Blocklength
Recall that there are four channels in the problem for-
mulation: Alice-to-Bob, Alice-to-Willie, jammer-to-Bob, and
jammer-to-Willie. In this section, we expand the channel
model to consider the situation where one or more of the
four channels is a fading channel. As in Section III, the
problem is investigated by first characterizing how the Alice-
to-Willie and jammer-to-Willie channels constrain (or not) the
allowable scheme at Alice, in particular the power that she
is able to employ while remaining covert. The achievable
performance under various metrics when Alice employs that
power then follows classical information and communication
theory based on the nature of the Alice-to-Bob and jammer-
to-Bob channels.
Consider first the case where the Alice-to-Willie channel is
an AWGN channel and the jammer-to-Willie channel is aM =
1 block fading channel. From an application perspective, this
appears at first to be a pessimistic case: the jammer who Alice
is counting on to confuse Willie is subject to fading, whereas
Willie has a strong direct path from Alice that makes the Alice-
to-Willie channel comparatively benign (AWGN). As in the
case when all of the channels are AWGN, we first demonstrate
that the optimal receiver at Willie is a power detector. Unlike
in Section III, here the jammer can transmit Gaussian noise
drawn from a distribution with constant variance Pj = Pmax,
since the channel randomizes the power received at Willie
from the jammer.
Lemma 3. Under the assumptions of the M = 1 block
fading model and Alice’s construction presented in Section
III but with the jammer transmitting Gaussian noise drawn
from a distribution with constant variance, Willie’s optimal
detector for detecting Alice’s transmission is to compare the
total received power in the slot of interest to a threshold.
Proof: Let ζ = Pj/d
α
j,w. The received jammer power σ
2
j is
exponentially distributed with mean ζ. As in Section III, note
that observations outside of k = 1, 2, . . . , n do not help Willie
to detect a transmission by Alice in slot t = 0; hence, it is
sufficient to consider Z0 as the input to Willie’s receiver. We
therefore suppress the slot index and denote Willie’s observa-
tion conditioned on θ by Z(θ) = [Z1(θ), Z2(θ), . . . , Zn(θ)]
where Zi(θ) ∼ CN (0, σ2w + θ). We distinguish between
H0 and H1 by introducing two non-negative valued random
variables Θ0 and Θ1 with probability density functions:
fΘρ(θ) =


1
ζ e
−θ/ζ, 0 < θ, ρ = 0,
1
ζ e
−(θ−σ2a)/ζ , σ2a < θ, ρ = 1,
0, otherwise.
(24)
Thus, Θ0 ≤lr Θ1 based on the assumptions presented in
Section II. The distribution of Willie’s observations condi-
tioned on θ is:
fZ(θ)(z) =
( 1
π(σ2w + θ)
)n
exp
(
− z
σ2w + θ
)
, (25)
where z is as defined in Section III. Hence, the LRT test is
optimal based on the NP rule and the optimal decision rule
for Willie again becomes:
Λ(Z) =
EΘ1 [fZ(θ)(Z)]
EΘ0 [fZ(θ)(Z)]
H1
≷
H0
γ. (26)
The monotonicity of Λ(·) then follows from Lemma 1 by
observing that, as in the proof of Lemma 2, Z(θ) ≤lr Z(θ′)
whenever θ ≤ θ′, and, as noted above, Θ0 ≤lr Θ1. Thus, the
LRT is equivalent to the power detector: Z ≷H1H0 Γn.
Next, we consider the case when the Alice-to-Willie channel
is also a M = 1 block fading channel. In practice, Willie
does not know the value of the fading coefficient h
(a,w)
0,1
on this channel and, indeed, that is our assumption in our
achievability result below. However, since we are interested in
an achievability result for covert communication from Alice to
Bob, giving Willie any extra knowledge (say, by a genie) only
strengthens the result. Hence, in the Corollary below, which
we use below to establish Theorem 2, we assume Willie knows
h
(a,w)
0,1 .
Corollary 3.1. Consider the assumptions of the model when
the jammer-to-Willie and Alice-to-Willie channels are block
fading channels with one fading block per codeword. Addi-
tionally, assume that Willie knows the value of h
(a,w)
0,1 . Then,
given Alice’s construction in Section III but with the jammer
transmitting Gaussian noise drawn from a distribution with
constant variance, Willie’s optimal detector for detecting a
transmission by Alice is to compare the total received power
in the slot of interest to a threshold.
Proof: Knowing h
(a,w)
0,1 and da,w, Willie knows σ
2
a , and the
proof follows from Lemma 3.
7Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of the single block fading
model, there exists a communication strategy for Alice, Bob,
and the jammer whereby Alice transmits with a power that
does not decrease with the blocklength while remaining covert
from warden Willie.
Proof: This proof follows along the lines of Theorem 1 and
is provided in Appendix A.
B. The Number of Covert Bits Transmitted Reliably
Theorem 2 establishes that Alice can transmit with power
not decreasing in the blocklength n while maintaining covert-
ness. In the case of AWGN channels on both the Alice-
to-Bob and jammer-to-Bob channels, the covert and reliable
communication of O(n) bits in n channel uses can be
achieved. However, when the Alice-to-Bob or jammer-to-Bob
channels are M -block fading channels, M ≥ 1, the problem
is analogous to the standard problem of communication over
slowly fading channels [12, Section 5.4]. Strictly speaking,
reliable communication as defined in Section II-B of O(n) bits
is not possible. In particular, if Alice transmits nR0 bits for
any given constant R0 > 0, there always exists some nonzero
probability, not diminishing in n, that the instantiations of
|h(a,b)0,m | and |h(j,b)0,m |, m = 1, 2, . . .M , will lead to a received
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) such that the
communication is not reliable.
However, the presence of the jammer, which allows Alice
to transmit at per-symbol power Pf > 0 not dependent on n
(versus O( 1√
n
) power per symbol when there is no jammer
[3]), greatly improves system performance even in the case
when the Alice-to-Bob or jammer-to-Bob channels are M -
block fading channels. This can be seen via multiple metrics.
First, if the metric of Section II-B is still of pertinent interest,
covert and reliable communication of o(n) bits is possible,
as demonstrated for M = 1 in Appendix B. Second, and
probably of more interest, is that the analog of the ǫ-outage
capacity (see [12]) is non-zero, whereas it would be zero for
any transmission power at Alice that decreases to 0 as n→∞.
V. M > 1 BLOCK FADING CHANNELS
Here we consider the case of an M > 1 block fading
channel on the jammer-to-Willie link. In contrast to the results
of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 for the AWGN and M = 1 block
fading channels on the Alice-to-Willie link, respectively, a
power detector is not the optimal detector for Willie. Instead,
we establish an important property of the optimal detector
in Lemma 4: that, if a given vector of observed powers for
the M blocks encompassing a slot results in a point on the
boundary between Willie’s decision regions, an increase in
any component of that vector results in a decision of H1.
Whereas this does not explicitly identify the optimal receiver,
it does guarantee an important property of the dividing “curve”
between the two decision regions: for any given M − 1
components of the vector of observed powers, there is at
most one solution for the remaining component that falls on
this curve between H0 and H1, as defined precisely below.
In particular, this is then sufficient to establish the result of
interest: that Alice can transmit covertly at power that does
not decrease with the blocklength n.
A. Properties of the Optimal Detector at Willie
With t = 0 the slot of interest, observations outside of
k = 1, 2, . . . , n do not help Willie detect transmissions by
Alice in slot t = 0. Therefore, the slot index is suppressed,
and we denote Willie’s observations by Zˆ = [Zˆ1, Zˆ2, . . . , Zˆn].
Conditioned on the fading coefficients on the jammer-to-Willie
channel, measurements within each fading block of length
n/M are i.i.d., but the measurements from different blocks
come from different distributions determined by the sequence
of block fading variables. Therefore, when Alice does not
transmit, Willie’s observations have the distribution:
f
Zˆ|H0(zˆ|H0) = Eh(j,w)
[
M∏
m=1
n/M∏
i=1
1
π(σ2w + σ
2
j,m)
· e−
|zˆ(m−1) n
M
+i|
2
(σ2w+σ
2
j,m
)
]
(27a)
=
M∏
m=1
E
h
(j,w)
m
[(
1
π(σ2w + σ
2
j,m)
) n
M
· e−
zm
(σ2w+σ
2
j,m
)
]
, (27b)
where h(j,w) = [h
(j,w)
1 , h
(j,w)
2 , . . . , h
(j,w)
M ] is the vector of
(complex) fading coefficients on the jammer-to-Willie channel,
zm =
∑n/M
i=1 |zˆ(m−1) nM+i|2, and σ2j,m =
P
(t)
j |h(j,w)m |2
dαj,w
. Let
ζ = P
(t)
j /d
α
j,w and Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , ZM ], where Zm =∑n/M
i=1 |Zˆ(m−1) nM+i|2 is the power measured in themth block.
The distribution of the vector Z of received powers across the
M blocks under H0 is:
fZ|H0(z|H0) =
1
πn
M∏
m=1
∫ ∞
0
(
1
σ2w + u
) n
M
· e−
zm
(σ2w+u) e−
u
ζ du (28)
=
e
Mσ2w
ζ
πn
M∏
m=1
∫ ∞
σ2w
(
1
v
) n
M
e−
zm
v e−
v
ζ dv. (29)
Similarly, the distribution under H1 is:
fZ|H1(z|H1) =
e
M(σ2w+σ
2
a)
ζ
πn
M∏
m=1
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
) n
M
· e− zmv e− vζ dv. (30)
The LRT test is then:
Λ(Z) =
e
Mσ2a
ζ
∏M
m=1
∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
) n
M e−
Zm
v e−
v
ζ dv∏M
m=1
∫∞
σ2w
(
1
v
) n
M e−
Zm
v e−
v
ζ dv
H1
≷
H0
γ. (31)
The LRT in (31) shows that Z forms a sufficient statistic for the
optimal test for Willie to determine whether Alice transmits
in that slot or not. The following lemma establishes that Λ(·)
is monotone increasing in each of its components.
8Lemma 4. Consider the assumptions of the multiple block
fading channel model and Alice’s construction presented in
Section III but with the jammer transmitting Gaussian noise
drawn from a distribution with constant variance. When the
Alice-to-Willie channel is AWGN and the jammer-to-Willie
channel is faded, Λ(Z) is monotonically increasing in each
of the components of Z.
Proof: Λ(Z) (defined in (26)) monotonically increases in Z
in the M = 1 case as shown in Appendix C. The proof then
follows from the observation that Λ(Z) in the M > 1 case
can be expressed as:
Λ(Z) =
M∏
i=1
Λ(Zi). (32)
Corollary 4.1. Consider the assumptions of the multiple block
fading model and Alice’s construction presented in Section III
but with the jammer transmitting Gaussian noise drawn from
a distribution with constant variance. Additionally, assume
that Willie knows h
(a,w)
0,m ,m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . When fading
exists on both the jammer-to-Willie channel and the Alice-to-
Willie channel, then the likelihood ratio Λ(Z) is monotonically
increasing in each of the components of Z.
Proof: Conditioned on Willie’s knowledge of h
(a,w)
0,m ,m =
1, 2, . . . ,M , the channel from Alice-to-Willie is an AWGN
channel with a different signal power for Alice per block;
hence, the result follows similarly to that of Lemma 4.
B. Covertness with Transmit Power not Decreasing in the
Blocklength
Next, we leverage Lemma 4 on the structure of the optimal
receiver at Willie to demonstrate the ability for Alice to
employ power not decreasing in the blocklength for the case
where there exists M > 1 block fading on the jammer-to-
Willie channel. The general concept of the proof is similar
to Theorem 1: demonstrate that the optimal detector at Willie
works poorly on a set of fading instantiations of the jammer’s
signal that has high probability.
Before we outline the proof, we first need to define a number
of regions that characterize Willie’s detector. Recall that a
sufficient statistic for Willie’s optimal detector is given by
Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , ZM ], where Zi is the power measured in the
ith block. A normalized version corresponding to the average
observed power per symbol within a block is also a sufficient
statistic for the optimal detector: X = [X1, X2, . . . , XM ],
where Xi =
Zi
n/M , i = 1, 2, . . .M . A detector for Willie is
defined by the regions RH0(n) and RH1(n), each in RM ,
where H0 is chosen if X ∈ RH0(n), and H1 is chosen if
X ∈ RH1(n). For the optimal detector at Willie, as given in
(31), a vector x is in RH1(n) if and only if Λ(
n
M x) > γ;
otherwise x is in RH0(n). Hence, define the boundary curve
dividing RH0(n) and RH1(n) as C(n) = {x : Λ( nM x) = γ}.
Finally, we define a boundary region, RδB(n), as the set of all
x that are within distance δ in each dimension of C(n); that
is:
RδB(n) = {x : ∃ y ∈ C(n) s.t. max
i
|xi − yi| < δ}. (33)
Define the M -dimensional vectors σ2j =
[σ2j,1, σ
2
j,2, . . . , σ
2
j,M ] and σ
2
w = σ
2
w[1, 1, . . . , 1]. Note
that σ2j is random, since it depends on the fading from the
jammer to Willie, whereas σ2w is deterministic and known
to Willie. The proof then proceeds, as follows. Given the
instantiation of the block fading values between the jammer
and Willie, which determines the expected jammer power per
symbol σ2j,i for the i
th fading block, the ith element of the
vector X has the expected value σ2j,i + σ
2
w (under H0) or
σ2j,i+σ
2
w+σ
2
a (under H1). The proof then begins with Lemma
5, which leverages Lemma 4 to show that the probability of
fading instantiations that result in σ2j + σ
2
w ∈ RδB(n) can be
made arbitrarily small by choosing δ small enough; hence,
the probability that the jamming is such that the average
power received per symbol when Alice is not transmitting is
in the boundary region can be made arbitrarily small. The
theorem then follows by considering what happens for the
(highly probable) event that the instantiation of the block
fading values yields σ2j + σ
2
w /∈ RδB(n); in this case, for
σ2a sufficiently small, the probability of missed detection or
the probability of false alarm is near one. Hence, Alice can
employ power that does not decrease with n and still achieve
covertness. Essentially, Willie is not able to set a boundary
curve that works for a large set of σ2j , and thus his detector
is only effective in the unlikely event that σ2j + σ
2
w is near
the boundary curve between his decision regions.
Lemma 5. Under the assumptions of the multiple block fading
model, for Willie’s optimal detector, with RδB(n) as defined
above, for any ǫ > 0 there exists δ > 0 s.t. P (h : σ2j + σ
2
w ∈
RδB(n)) < ǫ.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Theorem 3. Consider the assumptions of the multiple block
fading model and Alice’s construction in Section III but
with the jammer transmitting Gaussian noise drawn from a
distribution with constant variance. Then, there exists a com-
munication strategy for Alice, Bob, and the jammer whereby
Alice transmits with a power that does not decrease with the
blocklength while being covert from Willie.
Proof: Consider a covertness criterion PMD + PFA > 1 − ǫ.
By Lemma 5, choose δ > 0 s.t.:
P (h : σ2j + σ
2
w ∈ R2δB (n)) <
ǫ
4
. (34)
If the Alice-to-Willie channel is AWGN, choose constant
Pf > 0 such that σ
2
a < δ. If the Alice-to-Willie channel is
a M ≥ 1 block fading channel, choose Pf > 0 such that the
average received power from Alice is less than δ for all fading
blocks with high probability. We proceed with the proof for
the case when the Alice-to-Willie channel is AWGN, but the
modifications for when the Alice-to-Willie channel is aM ≥ 1
block fading channel follow similar steps to those shown in
the second part of the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A.
Consider an optimal detector at Willie for blocklength n,
with associated decision regions RH0(n) and RH1(n). First,
we present a sketch of the proof idea. Consider the case where
σ
2
w + σ
2
j ∈ RH0(n) \ R2δB (n). If Alice is employing σ2a < δ,
9the probability of Willie’s test result being in RH1(n) occurs
with small probability for large n, regardless of whether H0 or
H1 is true. Thus, Willie’s PMD will be large and PFA will be
small. Likewise, if σ2w+σ
2
j ∈ RH1(n)\R2δB (n), then Willie’s
PFA will be large and PMD will be small for large n.
The rigorous proof is the vector extension of that of
Theorem 2. Recall that [σ2j,1, σ
2
j,2, . . . , σ
2
j,M] is an i.i.d. vector,
where each component is exponentially distributed with mean
ζ. Hence, there exists a constant c s.t.
P
(
max
i=1,2,...,M
σ2j,i > c
)
<
ǫ
4
. (35)
Let
PFA(u) = P (X ∈ RH1(n)|σ2j + σ2w = u, H0). (36)
Under H0, Xi = (σ
2
w + σ
2
j,i)χ
2
2n
M ,i
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , where
{χ22n
M ,i
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M} is an i.i.d. collection of (central)
chi-squared random variables, each with 2n/M degrees of
freedom. By the weak law of large numbers, each converges
in probability to 1; since M is finite, this implies ∃N0 s.t.
∀n ≥ N0,
P
(
M⋂
i=1
{
χ22n
M ,i
∈
(
1− δ
σ2w + c
, 1 +
δ
σ2w + c
)})
> 1− ǫ
2
,
(37)
and
P
(
M⋂
i=1
{
Xi ∈
(
(σ2w + σ
2
j,i)
(
1− δ
σ2w + c
)
,
(σ2w + σ
2
j,i)
(
1 +
δ
σ2w + c
))})
> 1− ǫ
2
. (38)
Now, if maxi=1,2,...,M σ
2
j,i ≤ c, then σ2w +σ2j,i < σ2w + c, and
thus, for n ≥ N0:
P
(
M⋂
i=1
{
Xi ∈ (σ2w + σ2j,i − δ, σ2w + σ2j,i + δ)
})
> 1− ǫ
2
.
(39)
Thus, if u ∈ RH1 \R2δB (n), then P (X ∈ RH1) > 1− ǫ2 and
PFA(u) > 1− ǫ
2
. (40)
Next consider any u ∈ RH0 \R2δB (n). Then, recalling σ2a < δ,
the vector u+σ2a [1 1 . . . 1] cannot have any element within δ
of C(n). Then, following analogous arguments to those above,
∃N1 s.t. for n ≥ N1,
PMD(u) = P (X ∈ RH0(n)|σ2j + σ2w = u, H1) (41)
> 1− ǫ
2
(42)
for u ∈ RH0 \R2δB (n) whenevermaxi=1,2,...,M σ2j,i ≤ c. Thus,
unless
A = {u ∈ R2δB (n)} ∪
{
max
i=1,2,...,M
σ2j,i > c
}
(43)
occurs,
PFA(u) + PMD(u) > 1− ǫ
2
. (44)
By construction, P (A) < ǫ/2, and thus
PFA + PMD = EU [PFA(U) + PMD(U)] (45)
≥ EU [PFA(U) + PMD(U)|Ac]P (Ac) (46)
> 1− ǫ. (47)
The implications on reliable throughput are then analogous
to those discussed in Section IV-B.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Active Adversary May Help Covert Communication
The assumptions presented in Section II-A assume that the
jammer is attempting to help Alice and Bob to communicate
covertly. However, covert communication may still be possible
if an adversarial jammer is placed in the environment to
actively try to jam any potential communication by Alice,
as is commonly done in electronic warfare. For example,
suppose that Willie uses a jammer to inhibit communication
by any party; then, whereas this jammer does indeed decrease
the rate of any reliable (non-covert) communication, it may
actually facilitate covert communication by hurting Willie’s
ability to determine if Alice is transmitting. In particular, if
the jammer-to-Willie channel is faded and Willie’s jammer
transmits Gaussian noise, then exactly the same interference
model as derived for the constructions of Sections IV and
V applies. This enables covert communication from Alice
to Bob in precisely the same manner as in the case of a
“friendly” jammer. Note that this assumes that such a jammer
generates random Gaussian noise; if that jammer instead
generates a noise-like signal that is decodable by Willie (say,
using a Gaussian codebook shared by the jammer and Willie),
then Willie can conceivably decode the jammer’s signal and
subtract it from his received signal, subject only to the standard
challenges of successive interference cancellation in wireless
communication environments.
B. Relationship with Steganography
Steganography is the discipline of hiding messages in in-
nocuous objects. Typical steganographic systems modify fixed-
size finite-alphabet covertext objects into stegotext containing
hidden information, and are subject to a similar square root law
(SRL) as non-jammer assisted covert communication: O(√n)
symbols in size n covertext may safely be altered to hide
an O(√n logn)-bit message [16]. As explained in [3], the
mathematics of statistical hypothesis testing are responsible
for both SRLs while the extra logn factor is from the lack
of noise in the steganographic context. However, arguably the
earliest work on SRL shows that it is achievable without the
logn factor when an active adversary corrupts stegotext with
AWGN [17].2 That being said, [18] shows that, because Alice
in the steganographic setting has write-access to covertext, the
SRL can be broken and O(n) bits can be embedded in size n
2We note that the results of [2] and [3] were developed independently of
[17]. While [17] provides the proof of the SRL when Alice is average-power
constrained, [2] and [3] also develop the achievability of SRL for the peak-
power constained covert communication and the converse to the SRL.
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covertext using careful selection of the subset of the covertext
to be overwritten [18]. Thus, unlike the scenario considered
here, breaking the steganographic SRL does not require Willie
to be uncertain about the distribution of his observations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the ability for Alice
to transmit covertly and reliably to Bob with the help of
a jammer in the presence of a watchful adversary Willie.
For either an AWGN or block fading channel between the
jammer and Willie, under the assumption of a key of unlimited
length shared between Alice and Bob, we are able to establish
that Alice can transmit with power not decreasing in the
blocklength n while remaining covert, even when Willie
employs an optimal receiver. In the case of AWGN channels
from Alice to Bob and the jammer to Bob, this implies
positive rate covert communication. In the case of fading
channels on either the Alice-to-Bob link or the jammer-to-
Bob link, standard communication results for communication
over fading channels are achievable.
Whereas the wireless communication channel models pre-
sented here are standard practice for the design of reliable
communication systems, their mapping to the covert com-
munication problem motivates further study. In particular, the
assumption of block fading, which results in the jammer power
outside of the codeword slot of interest being independent of
that within the codeword slot of interest, needs to be carefully
examined. If the block fading model is too optimistic for
covert communication, a potential solution would be for the
jammer to randomly vary his/her power in each codeword
slot as is done here in the AWGN case. Hence, we feel
the most important assumption to be relaxed in future work
is that of synchronism between the slot boundaries at Alice
and the jammer. Whereas this assumption certainly seems
reasonable given the accuracy of modern clocks, small errors
might allow the adversary Willie to perform estimation of
the environment that could inhibit covert communication, and
thus, while complicating the model and requiring assumptions
on current technology, this deserves careful consideration.
Future work will also investigate the achievable performance
for covert communications under limitations on the size of the
shared key between Alice and Bob.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Construction: Alice and the jammer employ the same
methods as described in the construction of Lemma 3. Hence,
Willie is aware that the channel gain between the jammer
and himself results in σ2j being distributed as an exponential
random variable with mean ζ. If the Alice-to-Willie channel
is AWGN, Lemma 3 establishes that the optimal receiver for
Willie to employ is a power detector Z ≷H1H0 Γn for some
threshold Γn on the slot of size n, or, equivalently,
Z
n
H1
≷
H0
τn, (A.1)
where τn ≡ Γn/n. If the Alice-to-Willie channel is an M = 1
block fading channel, we assume pessimistically that Willie
also knows the value of h
(a,w)
0,1 . Then, Corollary 3.1 establishes
that the optimal receiver for Willie is again the power detector
in (A.1).
Analysis: Consider first the case when the Alice-to-Willie
channel is an AWGN channel. Recall that we require PFA +
PMD > 1 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0. Thus, consider any ǫ > 0.
The unboundedness of the support of σ2j requires a slight
modification of the proof technique of Theorem 1. Thus, note
that there exists some constant c such that:
P (σ2j > c) < ǫ/4. (A.2)
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Consider first the false alarm rate, and, analogously to the
proof of Theorem 1, define:
PFA(u) = P
(
Z
n
≥ τn|σ2j = u,H0
)
. (A.3)
Under H0, Z/n = (σ
2
w+σ
2
j )χ
2
2n/n. By the weak law of large
numbers, χ22n/n converges in probability to 1; hence, for any
δ > 0, ∃N0 (not dependent on u) such that, for n ≥ N0,
P
(
χ22n
n
∈
(
1− δ
σ2w + c
, 1 +
δ
σ2w + c
))
> 1− ǫ
2
. (A.4)
Hence, for any n > N0,
P
(
Z
n
∈
(
(σ2w + u)
(
1− δ
σ2w + c
)
,
(σ2w + u)
(
1 +
δ
σ2w + c
)))
> 1− ǫ
2
. (A.5)
Now, for any u ≤ c, σ2w + u < σ2w + c and thus for any
n > N0:
P
(
Z
n
∈ (σ2w + u− δ, σ2w + u+ δ)
)
> 1− ǫ
2
(A.6)
and thus PFA(u) ≥ 1− ǫ/2 for any τn < σ2w + u− δ as long
as u < c. Likewise, following analogous arguments, ∃N1 such
that, for any n > N1 (not dependent on u):
PMD(u) = P
(
Z
n
≤ τn|σ2j = u,H1
)
> 1− ǫ
2
(A.7)
for any τn > σ
2
w + u+ σ
2
a + δ, as long as u < c. Combining
these results yields that for any n > max(N0, N1):
PFA(u) + PMD(u) ≥ 1− ǫ
2
(A.8)
unless {u > c} or u ∈ A = {σ2w + u − δ < τn < σ2w + u +
σ2a + δ}. Now,
P (A) = P (τn − δ − σ2a − σ2w < U < τn + δ − σ2w) (A.9)
≤ σ
2
a + 2δ
ζ
(A.10)
where the last line follows by upper bounding the probability
density function of σ2j . A choice of δ = ζǫ/16 and σ
2
a = ζǫ/8
yields, via the Union Bound:
P (Ac ∩ {σ2j ≤ c}) ≥ 1−
ǫ
2
(A.11)
and then the proof follows analogously to the end of that of
Theorem 1. This completes the proof for the case that the
Alice-to-Willie channel is an AWGN channel.
Next, consider the case when the Alice-to-Willie channel is
a M = 1 block fading channel. Let ǫ2 > 0 be the covertness
constraint and set ǫ = ǫ2/2. Choose σ˜
2
a according to the
AWGN case above such that Alice is covert if the average
received power at Willie is σ˜2a . Finally, choose Pf such that:
P (σ2a < σ˜
2
a) > 1−
ǫ2
2
. (A.12)
Then, Alice can employ (constant) power Pf and satisfy the
covertness constraint for any ǫ > 0.
B. Proof of o(n) Covert Bits Transmitted for M = 1:
Consider the assumptions of the M = 1 fading model
and Alice’s construction in Section III but with the jammer
transmitting Gaussian noise drawn from a distribution with
constant variance. If fading channels exist between all parties,
there exists a covert communication strategy s.t. Bob can
reliably decode Alice’s messages if she transmits o(n) bits
in n channel uses.
Proof: By Theorem 2, Alice can transmit with Pf > 0
not dependent on n while remaining covert. What remains
is to demonstrate that Bob can decode the transmission with
probability of error less than δ for any δ > 0. Conditioned on
the fading variables h(a,b), h(j,b), the channel from Alice to
Bob is an AWGN channel with signal-to-noise ratio:
γ =
|h(a,b)|2 Pfdα
a,b
|h(j,b)|2 Pjdαj,b + σ
2
b
. (B.1)
Hence, given the distributions of h(a,b) and h(j,b), there exists
a constant rate R such that the probability that γ is large
enough to support communication with reliability greater than
1− δ2 at rate R is greater than 1− δ2 (R is the δ2 -outage capacity
[12], which is non-zero). Since o(n) < nR for all n > N0 for
some N0, the result follows.
C. Proof of Increasing Λ(Z) for the M = 1 case for the
Proof of Lemma 4:
Let ζ = Pj/d
α
j,w. Hence, in the fading model, the received
jammer power σ2j is exponentially distributed with mean ζ.
As in Section III, since the t = 0 slot is the slot of interest,
observations outside of k = 1, 2, . . . , n do not help Willie
to detect a transmission by Alice in slot t = 0. Hence, it is
sufficient to consider Z0 as the input to Willie’s receiver. As
in Section III, we therefore suppress the slot index and denote
Willie’s observation by Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn]. It is then readily
established that Z =
∑n
i=1 |Zi|2 is a sufficient statistic, with
distribution under H0 given by:
fZ|H0(z|H0) = Eσ2j
[(
1
π(σ2j + σ
2
w)
)n
exp
(
− z
(σ2j + σ
2
w)
)]
=
1
πn
∫ ∞
0
(
1
u+ σ2w
)n
e
− z
(u+σ2w) e−
u
ζ du
=
e
σ2w
ζ
πn
∫ ∞
σ2w
(
1
v
)n
e−
z
v e−
v
ζ dv. (C.1)
Via analogous arguments, the distribution when Alice trans-
mits is:
fZ|H1(z|H1) =
e
σ2w+σ
2
a
ζ
πn
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
z
v e−
v
ζ dv. (C.2)
Hence, in this case the optimal decision rule for Willie
becomes:
Λ(Z) =
e
σ2a
ζ
∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
Z
v e−v/ζdv∫∞
σ2w
(
1
v
)n
e−
Z
v e−
v
ζ dv
H1
≷
H0
γ. (C.3)
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Now, consider any observation Z = z(0) that falls on the
boundary between the decision regions:
Λ(z(0)) =
e
σ2a
ζ
∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv∫∞
σ2w
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv
= γ, (C.4)
and consider the LRT when Willie observes z(0) +∆:
Λ(z(0) +∆) =
e
σ2a
ζ
∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv∫∞
σ2w
(
1
v
)n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv
. (C.5)
The common integration term in the numerator and denomi-
nator of (C.5) is extracted to yield:
Λ(z(0) +∆) =
[
e
σ2a
ζ
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv
]
·
[∫ σ2w+σ2a
σ2w
(
1
v
)n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv
+
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv
]−1
.
(C.6)
Next, (C.6) is normalized by the common integration range∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv to yield:
Λ(z(0) +∆) =
e
σ2a
ζ
∫ σ2w+σ2a
σ2w
( 1v )
n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e
− v
ζ dv
∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
( 1v )
n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e
− v
ζ dv
+ 1
. (C.7)
The Second Mean Value Theorem [19, Chapter 4.7] implies
that ∃c1 ∈ (σ2w, σ2w + σ2a) such that:
e
− ∆c1
∫ σ2w+σ2a
σ2w
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv
=
∫ σ2w+σ2a
σ2w
(
1
v
)n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv. (C.8)
Similarly, because e
− ∆
σ2w+σ
2
a ≤ e−∆v ≤ 1 for v ∈ [σ2w+σ2a ,∞),
e
− ∆
σ2w+σ
2
a
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv
≤
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv
≤
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv (C.9)
which implies:
e
− ∆
σ2w+σ
2
a ≤
∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv
≤ 1. (C.10)
Hence, the ratio of the integrals in (C.10) is either equal to
one, or ∃c2 ∈ [σ2w + σ2a ,∞) such that:
e
− ∆c2
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
) n
M
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv
=
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
) n
M
e−
(z(0)+∆)
v e−
v
ζ dv. (C.11)
If there exists such a c2 ∈ [σ2w + σ2a ,∞), then:
Λ(z(0) +∆) =
e
σ2a
ζ
e
− ∆
c1
∫ σ2w+σ2a
σ2w
( 1v )
n
e−
z(0)
v e
− v
ζ dv
e
− ∆
c2
∫
∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
( 1v )
n
e−
z(0)
v e
− v
ζ dv
+ 1
(C.12)
>
e
σ2a
ζ
∫ σ2w+σ2a
σ2w
( 1v )
n
e−
z(0)
v e
− v
ζ dv
∫
∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
( 1v )
n
e−
z(0)
v e
− v
ζ dv
+ 1
(C.13)
where (C.13) follows by noting that e−
∆
x is monotonically
increasing in x and c2 > c1. And (C.13) also holds if the ratio
of the integrals in (C.10) is equal to one, in which case e−
∆
c2
is replaced by 1 in (C.12). Multiplying (C.13) through by the
term
∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv yields:
Λ(z(0) +∆) >
[
e
σ2a
ζ
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv
]
·
[∫ σ2w+σ2a
σ2w
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv
+
∫ ∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv
]−1
(C.14)
=
e
σ2a
ζ
∫∞
σ2w+σ
2
a
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv∫∞
σ2w
(
1
v
)n
e−
z(0)
v e−
v
ζ dv
(C.15)
= γ (C.16)
where (C.16) follows from the assumption in (C.4). Hence, if
an observation z(0) is such that Λ(z(0)) = γ, then an increase
in the observed power z results in Λ(z) > γ.
D. Proof of Lemma 5
To bound the probability of RδB(n), we construct a set of
RδBM (n) that includes all points in R
δ
B(n) and measure the
probability of RδBM (n). Define the (M−1)-dimensional vector
x∼m = [x1, x2, . . . , xm−1, xm+1, . . . , xM ] as the vector x
with the mth component removed. The set RδBM (n) is then
created iteratively as follows.
For the initialization step, consider solving for the values
(if there are any) of x1, the first component of the vector
x = [x1, x2, . . . , xM ], for which x ∈ C(n), with the other
components fixed. By Lemma 4, we know that, for a given
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[x2, x3, . . . xM ], the set of x1 such that x ∈ C(n) consists of
no points or a single point; thus, let:
g(x∼1) =
{
undefined, no x1 s.t. x ∈ C(n)
x1, a single x1 s.t. x ∈ C(n).
(D.1)
Then, define:
RδB1(n) = {x : x1 ∈ (g(x∼1)− δ, g(x∼1) + δ)}. (D.2)
where it will be implicitly assumed that we only include x for
which g(x∼1) is defined.
We then start with RδB1(n) and iterate in a similar fashion
through the other dimensions to successively build RδBm(n)
from RδBm−1(n),m = 2, 3, . . . ,M , except now we are adding
onto both sides of a region rather than a curve in each case.
As a consequence of Lemma 4, note that, as we fix all of
the components except xm and then consider the xm s.th. x
falls in a given boundary region, we always get no solution,
a single point, or an interval. Hence, define
lm(x∼m) =


undefined, no xm s.t.
x ∈ RδBm−1(n)
inf{xm : x ∈ RδBm−1(n)}, ∃ xm s.t.
x ∈ RδBm−1(n)
(D.3)
and
um(x∼m) =


undefined, no xm s.t.
x ∈ RδBm−1(n)
sup{xm : x ∈ RδBm−1(n)}, ∃ xm s.t.
x ∈ RδBm−1(n).
(D.4)
We then construct RδBm(n),m = 2, 3, . . . ,M from R
δ
Bm−1
(n)
as follows:
RδBm(n) = R
δ
Bm−1(n)⋃ {
x : xm ∈
(
lm(x∼m)− δ, lm(x∼m)
)}
⋃ {
x : xm ∈
(
um(x∼m), um(x∼m) + δ
)}
.
(D.5)
We are adding a layer of thickness δ to each side in dimension
m at the mth stage.
Next we show that RδB(n) ⊂ RδBM (n). By construction,
RδB1(n) contains all points x such that ∃ y ∈ C(n) such
that |x1 − y1| < δ and xi = yi, i = 2, 3, . . . ,M . Thus,
by construction, RδB2(n) contains all points x such that∃y ∈ C(n) such that |x1 − y1| < δ, |x2 − y2| < δ and
xi = yi, i = 3, 4, . . . ,M . Continuing, R
δ
BM
(n) contains all
points x such that ∃y ∈ C(n) such that |x1 − y1| < δ,
|x2−y2| < δ, . . . , |xM −yM | < δ. Hence, RδB(n) ⊂ RδBM (n).
What remains is to measure the probability of RδBM (n) by
applying a union bound. For m = 2, . . . ,M , consider first the
measure of the “lower” region added at the mth step. Let
Lm =
{
x : xm ∈
(
lm(x∼m)− δ, lm(x∼m)
)}
(D.6)
Fig. 4. An example showing the construction of the set Rδ
BM
(n) that includes
the boundary region for M = 2 block fading conditions. X1 and X2 are the
normalized power measurements in the first and second block respectively.
The solid line (−) represents the boundary curve C(n). The solid grey region
represents the portion of the boundary that is defined by considering points
that fall within δ of C(n) in the first dimension. The striped boundary region
represents the portion of the boundary region constructed from iterating in
the second dimension.
and note:
P (σ2j + σ
2
w ∈ Lm)
=
∫
Lm
M∏
i=1
fσ2j,i+σ2w(xi)dxi (D.7)
≤
∫
x∼m
∫ l(x∼m)
l(x∼m)−δ
M∏
i=1
fσ2j,i+σ2w(xi)dxi (D.8)
=
∫
x∼m
M∏
i=1
i6=m
fσ2j,i+σ2w(xi)
·
[∫ l(x∼m)
l(x∼m)−δ
fσ2j,m+σ2w(xm)dxm
]
d(x∼m) (D.9)
≤
∫
x∼m
M∏
i=1
i6=m
fσ2j,i+σ2w(xi)
· [δ sup
x
fσ2j,m+σ2w(x)] d(x∼m) (D.10)
= δ sup
x
fσ2j,1+σ2w (x). (D.11)
Likewise, defining
Um =
{
x : xm ∈
(
um(x∼m), um(x∼m) + δ
)}
, (D.12)
it is shown by nearly identical steps that P (Um) ≤
δ supx fσ2j,1+σ2w(x) for m = 2, . . . ,M . Now, by the construc-
tion in (D.5), a union bound implies that:
P (RδBM (n)) ≤ P (RδBM−1(n)) + P (LM ) + P (UM ) (D.13)
≤ P (RδBM−1(n)) + 2δ sup
x
fσ2j,1+σ2w(x). (D.14)
Repeating this argument for M − 1,M − 2, . . . , 2 and rec-
ognizing that P (RδB1(n)) can be bounded in a set of steps
analogous to those leading up to (D.11) yields:
P (RδBM (n)) ≤ 2Mδ sup
x
fσ2j,1+σ2w(x). (D.15)
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Hence, a selection of δ = ǫ/(2M supx fσ2j,1+σ2w(x)) yields
P (h : σ2j + σ
2
w ∈ RδBM(n)) < ǫ and thus P (h : σ2j + σ2w ∈
RδB(n)) < ǫ.
